This is an essay I wrote comparing repression and institutionalisation, with respect to how much of a threat they are to social movements. It's obviously much more complex than the length of the essay allows, but the gist is that the context defines the threat each poses. If opposition agents can act with impunity, and the movement doesn't enjoy a lot of popular sopport or can equally be repressed, outright repression is the greatest threat. But then in the UK, for example, where state repression is fairly minimal, institutionalisation can be a much greater threat.
Oh, and because I had to answer the question, I suggest one is worse than the other, which I don't really agree with!
Repression has been defined as “any action taken by [government] authorities to impede mobilization, harass and intimidate activists, divide organisations and physically assault, arrest, imprison and/or kill movement participants†(Stockdill, quoted in Earl 2003: 45). These would traditionally include harassment, intimidation, assault, detainment and murder. Earl expanded this definition to include non-forceful forms of repression such as limiting the legal scope and powers of NGOs or covertly subverting a movement from within. Repression can be exercised by state or private actors, or actors where the two are confused, such as policemen or politicians sympathetic with private interests (Earl 2003: 46-47).
Good examples of brutal repression can be found in South American countries such as Chile, Argentina and Uruguay, which suffered under military dictatorships at several points during the 20th Century. Democratically elected leaders such as Allende in Chile were overthrown, dissidents were tortured and killed; human rights abuses were widespread. Right-wing governments collaborated to pursue transnational campaigns of repression against left-wing opposition movements, from mainstream figures such as Allende to extremists such as Marxist guerrillas. The most stark example of these activities is Operation Condor, a campaign of assassination and intelligence gathering conducted by the governments of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay in the mid-1970s. With the support of the United States, the governments represented an overpowering force that kept Pinochet in power in Chile for 17 years. Many movement members were forced to leave the country, and even then they were hunted down as far afield as the United States and France (van Auken 2004, McLeary 2004).
In this case, repression would seem to be overwhelmingly effective; if you're going to repress a movement, killing many of its members and causing others to desist or flee seems like the best option. However, while repression usually demobilises citizens, excessive abuses may directly stimulate mobilisation. Of course the type of mobilisation it stimulates will depend upon factors including the opportunity structures left open by the repressive actors and the resources available to the early risers (Loveman 1998: 485).
In Chile, the Pinochet dictatorship ended in 1990 (though Pinochet didn't step down as Commander in Chief of the Chilean Armed Forces until 1998) in part because of oppositional movements that arose in reaction to his repression. In spite of the culture of fear he created, human rights organisations persisted and in some cases grew. They were helped by economic factors that, with a global repression and a downturn in the Chilean economy, promoted popular unrest – opportunity structures that were out of the control of the repressive state. The movement grew out of, and was facilitated by, religious organisations including the Catholic Church, associations of family members of victims and, towards the end of the dictatorship, political parties. These groups had strong transnational links, particularly the Catholic Church, and could count on the allegiance or at least sympathy of most ordinary Chileans (Loveman 1998: 487-489).
Not even the military dictatorship, with the support of its neighbouring states and, covertly, the United States, could repress the networks that assisted the oppositional movements. Thus, when the opportunity arose, the repressive powers of the state were overwhelmed by the people.
The importance of opportunity is underlined by the case of Burma, where a similarly brutal dictatorship still holds power. The Burmese junta enjoy the economic support of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the United Kingdom and other developed states. Despite boycotts and relatively low-key protest movements, spearheaded by human rights organisations like Amnesty International, foreign intervention even in the form of sanctions seems unlikely. Inside the state, the junta is able to match any popular risings with overwhelming repression. In 1987 an opportunity not unlike the one that the Chileans seized so successfully arose: the Burmese leader changed the currency overnight, making the savings of most Burmese people worthless. Farmers rebelled, were joined by students and after facing down a massacre by the hands of the army 10,000 people marched into the capital city. The rebellion persisted through 1998, but they had not won, and the army soon cracked down, murdering and imprisoning thousands. The junta resurfaced, rebranded but with the same personnel and character (Pilger 1998: 192-198).
Of course this kind of brutal repression couldn't be used by every state, nor private actors in said states. Democratic states have violently repressed social movements, such as the extreme police tactics deployed against anti-globalisation protestors in Genoa and the actions of the American police during the race riots of the 1960s. They have also sought to covertly subvert and coerce movements, most notoriously with the COINTELPRO operations aimed at attacking dissident political organisations within the United States. Initially targetting communists under McCarthy, then branching out to tackle various threads of the “New Leftâ€, the Black Panthers and even the Ku Klux Klan, the FBI repressed social movements across the political spectrum with little blowback; though it has undoubtedly tarnished the image of the FBI and the federal government, the establishment rolls on unharmed.
Again, however, the success of COINTELPRO lies as much in the social context in which it was pursued as with the repressive tactics it involved. Opposition to the movements they repressed was and remains relatively popular, particularly in the case of the communists. For actors who cannot rely on such favourable circumstances, there remains only one form of repression: channelling. By shaping or introducing regulations, states can limit opportunities available to more institutionalised social movement organisations (SMOs), thereby repressing their activities. Channelling can be observed both in democratic states where, for example, laws passed by states in America in the 1960s and 1970s prevented campus protests. Pinochet's dictatorship channelled the activities of the Catholic Church by obstructing the flow of international funds. And simply by creating a tangle of regulations that limit the scope of activities that NGOs can engage in, states can channel their activities (Earl 2003: 50-51). For example, charitable organisations in the UK are unable to pursue political ends, thus forcing SMOs to choose between the financial benefits of charitable status and the political problems that status poses.
Channelling, however, relies on a degree of institutionalisation. SMOs may operate outside of the scope of regulations, and they may simply break laws designed to constrain them. Greenpeace activists, for example, routinely break the law when performing protest stunts. Only through seizure of finances or by declaring the SMO itself illegal can the state wield its muscle and forcibly repress it.
In fact, channelling may be thought of as a kind of institutionalisation rather than repression. For example, organisations seeking to stage large-scale demonstrations in the United States and the United Kingdom need to obtain a permit. SMOs involved in the protests outside the US Democratic National Convention in 1996 were only allowed to protest at three designated sites, none of which took them past the convention centre. Those seeking to speak to and leaflet passers by and delegates were restrained inside a metal cage. The state framed these restrictions as being necessary to contain the more violent elements of the protest movements, whilst in fact containing the effectiveness of demonstrations that were largely peaceful anyway. By engaging constructively with the SMOs over a period of time – institutionalising their activities – police forces in democratic states have been able to normalise public demonstrations, thereby reducing their impact (McCarthy, McPhail 1998: 83-84).
This can also be seen in the negotiations between the trade unions, the Socialist Worker Party and police over the annual Mayday demonstrations, which now follow a specified route cordoned off by the police (with the exception of a smaller number of anarchists and other radicals who continue to protest without permission). The institutionalisation of these protests has been especially effective because the SMOs want to avoid the bad publicity created by violence, especially when they are organising exceptionally large demonstrations such as the anti-war march of 16th March 2003, which attracted a broad base of support. On the other hand, one could say that though the SMOs were limited in their activities by agreeing to be channelled, they didn't lose any worthwhile options – violence and other forms of illegality would have put many of the one million protesters off – and gained the legitimacy required to win over moderate sympathisers.
Channelling is at its most effective when the organisations are highly institutionalised and centralised. Professional SMOs have full-time staff, are incorporated or at least have a formal constitution and legal status and tend to have a heirachy to manage these structures. Voluntarily SMOs may still adopt the same organisational trappings, and enjoy financial benefits from legal status. The more interaction between the SMO and the state, and the more levels and areas on which they interact, the more opportunities the state has to channel their activities.
Institutionalisation carries other benefits with their dark side. SMOs who have close links with state or private actors will be invited to participate in their policy and implementation processes. Reputable NGOs can confidently walk the corridors of power, speaking to politicians, CEOs and others in a convivial (at best) or non-confrontational (at the least) context. However, once in this position an SMO will be under pressure to moderate what they say. Too radical a message may alienate them from those in power and wreck their relationship. The state or private actor can then put pressure on the SMO by either explicitly or implicitly making known boundaries of acceptable behaviour and position. Thus an SMO that, for example, seeks to radically transform environmental legislation to include the precautionary principle may find itself arguing for minor reforms that in no way correspond to its original aims.
One could defend this change as being pragmatic, pointing out that SMOs that fail to institutionalise may fail to effect any change at all. But even if this were true, institutionalisation would still represent a serious threat to social movements. In fact, I'd suggest that it is made even more dangerous by the fact that SMOs outside the institutions are made less effective by the close links their institutionalised competitors enjoy; the state will choose to work with, and listen to, those that are most malleable. Only SMOs that can disrupt the state are exempt from this danger. One could also advance the normative position that this institutionalisation is merely the SMO becoming part of the democratic process, and that it's better than a confrontational arrangement.
In its extreme form, SMOs can become entirely coopted, dropping positions that threaten the establishments they work within and even adopting positions that they would otherwise have disagreed with. As institutionalisation tends to accompany centralisation and a drift in position towards the establishment, so SMOs can lose touch with their grassroots. This can create several new problems. First, with little popular support, both from activists and sympathisers, an SMO may suffer a deficit of legitimacy, undermining its bargaining power within establishments that must, to some extent, be swayed by popular opinion. Second, the SMO will lose a large base from which they can develop intellectual and tactical vitality, and so may become preoccupied with bureaucracy to the detriment of their goals. Finally, the SMO will lose the tactical advantages that a grassroots base of activists can give them, such as the ability to stage mass demonstrations, targeted stunts or mass lobbies.
As McAdam notes:
“The establishment of formal organizations [...] sets in motion [...] the destructive forces of oligarchization, cooptation, and the dissolution of indigenous support [all of which] tames the movement by encouraging insurgents to pursue only those goals acceptable to external sponsors. [...] The long list of movements that have failed to negotiate these obstacles attests to the difficulties inherent in the effort†(quoted in L. Earle 2004, p.5)
Not only does institutionalisation tame SMOs, but movements too. If social movements are supposed to provide a more open, accessible space for oppositional and contentious politics, then the process of institutionalisation effectively shuts them down. Participation becomes increasingly difficult, and the decision makers increasingly unaccountable and unapproachable.
Worse still, if SMOs are institutionalised it is unlikely that a popular reaction will create new spaces that have as much power and weight as the original SMO. Unless the principle SMOs in a movement completely diverge from their constituency it is likely that any competing SMOs that try to redress the balance will suffer the shadow of the institutionalised SMO. This can be contrasted with the effect of repression, which, as I stated with the Chilean example, tends to promote popular uprisings. Unlike Burma, where the state could exercise brutal powers to repress even large-scale resistance, most states can only engage in more understated and covert forms of repression, with limited usefulness. Institutionalisation, on the other hand, can be employed in any state from Chile to the United Kingdom, and can be made a continuous policy process, engaging with every sizeable SMO in an attempt to diffuse movements.
What makes institutionalisation that much more threatening to social movements, then, is not the weight or force that it can bring to bear on movements but its effectiveness and the safety from blowback. A state or private actor cannot be accused of human rights violations or gross misconduct for entering into a dialogue with social movements, and it can contain movements in the long term far more effectively than with limited repressive forces.
Earl, J (2003). 'Tanks, Tear Gas, and Taxes: Toward a Theory of Movement Repression'. Sociological Theory, vol. 21
Earle, L (2004). Social Movements and NGOs: A Preliminary Investigation, International NGO Training and Research Centre website, http://www.intrac.org/Intrac/docs/SocialMovementsandNGOs.doc, on file with author
Loveman, M (1998). 'High-Risk Collective Action: Defending Human Rights in Chile, Uruguay, and Argentina'. The American Journal of Sociology, vol. 104
McCarthy, J, McPhail, C (1998). 'The Institutionalisation of Protest in the United States'. In The Social Movement Society: Contentious Politics for a New Century. Boston: Rowman & Littlefield
McLeary, P (2004). 'The long and lethal reach of Gen. Pinochet. Declassified memos show Kissinger, Nixon condoned assassination, human rights abuses in Chile'. San Francisco Chronicle, 14 March
Pilger, J (1998). Hidden Agendas. London: Vintage.
Van Auken, B (2004). 'Chile's arrest of Pinochet and the "Condor" killers in the US'. World Socialist Web Site, http://www.wsws.org/articles/2004/dec2004/pino-d18.shtml, on file with author