Framing

This is an essay I wrote about frame alignment processes. It introduces the concept of frames, then looks at four processes and four kinds of frames that social movements might use. It finally sketches some issues that arise from framing.

Explain how social and political movements seek to ‘frame’ issues. Consider the issues that arise from this endeavour.

Frames are both a linguistic term and a social construct that give social movements enormous power. They enable social movements to recruit members, influence the general public, shape and control public discourse, and even to pre-emptively defeat antagonists' arguments and strategies. There are various framing mechanisms commonly used by social movements that I will explore, including bridging, amplification, extension and transformation. Each mechanism raises issues for social movements themselves, in terms of how they can best achieve their aims, and for society as a whole, in terms of the relative legitimacy of movements.

The term “frame” was defined in a socio-political context by Goffman as a schema of interpretation that enables individuals “to locate, perceive, identify and label” phenomena. Frames allow us to give phenomena meaning so that we can “organize experience and guide action” (Snow et al, 1986: 464). In this sense we are framing all of the time, filtering and collecting information about everything from what we have done over the past few days to how the nation should tackle complex political issues. Social movements frame issues when they describe a problem and their proposed solution. Frames are, therefore, social constructions insofar as a group of people come together around a particular frame and then seek to develop this and other frames for particular ends. Since frames are associated with various processes that I will go on to describe, social movements are continually constructing and developing frames (Klandermans, 1997: 45-56).

It is also important to note that frames define or describe phenomena relative to a particular conceptual framework. Lakoff gives the example of the word 'revolt', which he says “implies a population that is being ruled unfairly”. The use of the word 'revolt', in other words, shapes our perception of the issue being described by, in this case, making us think that whomever opposes the revolt is bad and that those involved in the revolt are just (Lakoff, 2003).

Social movements employ frames for a variety of reasons. Many of the most common processes can be collectively described as “frame alignment”, whereby an individual or organisation seeks to link their frames with others', so that they can become congruent and complementary. According to Snow et al (1986: 464), “frame alignment is a necessary condition for movement participation”, because if an individual disagrees with a movement's interpretation of past phenomena and future actions, he or she won't want to participate.

The key to framing is to move individuals between four “pools”, representing levels of support for a social movement organisation (SMO). We can distinguish in the general public those who oppose an SMO's position on a given issue (their antagonist pool), those who are ambivalent, those who sympathise with them (their sympathy pool) and those who agree with the SMO to the point where they participate (the adherence pool). Any SMO will want to move as many people as possible across the pools in the order stated, such that more people become sympathetic and eventually participate.

Snow et al (1986) distinguish four ways in which frames can be used for alignment: bridging, amplification, extension and transformation. The first of these mechanisms, frame bridging, involves linking two or more frames together regarding a particular issue. The two frames have to be ideologically congruent but structurally unconnected, such that, previous to the process of bridging, the frames allow for a common perception of the issue but they don't guide a common action. Frame bridging can occur between movements, organisations, individuals or a combination of the three.

The goal of this process is to bring unconnected groups into a specific structure more conducive to collective action. If one assumes that collective action arises from individuals belonging to a particular organisation, as opposed to simply sharing a sentiment or perception, then frame bridging is an important process for SMOs. They can use frame bridging to identify a “probable adherent pool” and to then “bring these individuals within the SMO's infrastructure” (Snow et al, 1986: 468). This new base of structurally cohesive individuals can then be used for anything from political action to fund raising. They can also then themselves bridge frames with other individuals and organisations, or provide the means for the SMO to expand its frame bridging operations.

For example, Moral Majority, a movement of the Christian Right in America, used its pool of structurally cohesive adherents to raise “in excess of 2.2 million dollars via mass mailing campaigns”. They then used this money on “extensive media campaigns” that tied (ideologically congruent but structurally unconnected) religious conservatives into the organisation. And there is also evidence that organisations in the peace movement in Texas used frame bridging to connect themselves to other organisations by targeting ideologically congruent publications and events (Snow et al, 1986: 468).

The second mechanism, frame amplification, involves clarifying and invigorating an existing frame. This mechanism is necessary because individuals ascribe to a huge number of values and beliefs that frame their interpretations of phenomena, and they frequently arrange them in a hierarchy “such that some have greater salience than others” (Snow et al, 1986: 469). For an SMO to bring an individual into its structure or to motivate action on a particular issue, it has to be able to appeal to an interpretive frame relating to the issue that the individual prioritises, simply because individuals cannot possibly mobilise themselves on every issue that they find ideologically appealing. So by amplifying a given frame, an SMO can convince individuals that a particular issue is worth their time and effort.

There are two kinds of frame amplification identified by Snow et al (1986: 469): value amplification and belief amplification. By values, they refer to “modes of conduct or sates of existence that are thought to be worthy of protection and promotion”. So value amplification involves identifying values that an individual or community holds, and then elevating their importance to the point where the values themselves inspire collective action within the structure of the SMO.

A compelling example of this can be found in the Christian Right movement in America, where “value politics” has come to dominate discourse. Lakoff (2003) identifies a moral system predicated on the “strict father” family, according to which we require strong, disciplined leaders (father figures) to stand up to us, and for our own sake. This interpretive frame allows leaders in the movement to win support not by providing any factual basis for their claims, but by appealing to that value. Similarly they can appeal to the values that they identify and amplify in The Bible to win support on moral issues like abortion and gay marriage. Or to take another example, Martin Luther King quoting from the U.S. Constitution and other documents important in the American mindset helped him to amplify the value of equality. Value amplification refers to, and defines, the goals of a movement, and makes it difficult for any opposition to redefine them.

The second kind of frame amplification, on the other hand, refers to “ideational elements that cognitively support or impede action”, i.e. beliefs. It is “sociologically axiomatic” that our actions are contingent on our beliefs (Snow et al, 1986: 470), and so an SMO will naturally seek to shape or control individuals' beliefs pertaining to a particular issue to guide their action. Put simply, I won't act on some evidence that I don't believe.

One can identify three kinds of belief that determine action and that are relevant to frame amplification: beliefs about the antagonists or targets of influence; beliefs about the efficacy of action; and beliefs about the necessity or propriety of taking action. The first kind of belief is easily amplified by appealing to stereotypes. For example, in a neighbourhood campaign against the relocation of a Salvation Army shelter, to overcome the values associated with the antagonists (Christian charity, etc.) the leaders of the movement amplified the stereotype of the shelter's 'customers'; they personified these people as “slothful, alcoholic, mentally deranged, criminalistic and sex-crazed” and emphasised the threat they posed to neighbourhood residents, “particularly women and children” (Snow et al, 1986: 470). It's important to note that the activists didn't invent these beliefs, but rather amplified them in their target audience: their neighbourhood and those in a position of power. So when the politicians came to decide on the application for relocation, they were faced with a decision to bring these stereotypically undesirable men into their community, rather than a decision to bring in a Christian charity.

The second kind of belief, about the efficacy of any action, is especially important in movements that face long odds. Individuals won't participate if they don't think they will be effective, and so to motivate and sustain participation leaders of movements must elevate the belief that the movement will meet its goals. For example, leaders in the nuclear disarmament movement in America draw analogies between their work and the nineteenth-century abolitionist movement, which was highly successful (Snow et al, 1986: 471). Leaders and those working in the media arm of a movement will also frequently refer to and amplify previous successes to inspire confidence in the movement's members.

Where a movement seems to have little chance of success, leaders can also amplify the necessity or propriety of participation. These sentiments have been common amongst the anti-war movement in the past few years, particularly in the run-up to the Iraq war in countries where the governments had either voted to go to war, or were almost certain to do so in the near future. Demonstrators cited standing up for democracy and bearing witness for the sake of history as reasons for taking to the streets when they knew that the war was likely to still go ahead 1. Of course appeals to propriety will involve amplification of values as well; for the given example, the value of democracy was amplified to in turn amplify the belief that it was proper to stand up for that value.

The third framing mechanism is frame extension, which is used by SMOs when they are unable to establish sufficiently large sympathy or adherence pools by bridging and amplifying their core frames. In this situation they can extend their frames to encompass frames shared by a target audience, such that those people become ideologically congruent with the SMO and are then open to become structurally congruent. The newly adopted frame should be “of considerable salience to the potential adherents”, and should of course not contradict any of the core frames of the SMO, though sometimes contradictions do seem apparent (Snow et al, 1986: 472).

A popular example is when an SMO organises a music concert or fund raising event that attracts a large audience. By extending their frame to encompass these auxiliary interests, they can reach a far larger crowd than their core frames would allow. So in 1978 the UK-based Anti Nazi League organised the Rock Against Racism concert in Hyde park, headlined by white punk rockers like The Clash and black reggae bands like Jimmy Pursey. The acts were already politicised, so the frame extension wasn't egregious in the sense that they weren't hi-jacking the appeal of their musicians, and it helped the ANL massively widen its sympathy pool, opening up possibilities for frame bridging and amplification.

Of course sometimes the extension is more contentious, as with the Muslim Association of Britain (MAB) and its recent anti-war stance. By extending the frame described by their stated aim of “protecting human rights in general and Muslims in particular” to include opposing wars that they perceive as persecuting Muslims in particular, they have been able to bridge with other anti-war groups like the Socialist Workers Party. But in doing so, despite their stated aim to avoid “relationships of cooperation and coordination” with organisations that “contradict the aims and objectives of the MAB”, they, an anti-abortion, Islamist organisation have created relationships with organisations with contradictory aims2. This has created a disruptive tension within the movement.

Sometimes an existing set of frames may not be congruent, or may even be contradictory, with the existing frames of an SMOs target audience. That it not to say that they stop advocating one cause and change their focus to something altogether different. Rather, an SMO can assimilate new values and beliefs into their epistemological framework and develop new interpretive frames that are more congruent with their target audience, thereby replacing or expanding their sympathy and adherence pools.

In the American anti-pornography movement, for example, the dominant interpretive frame was informed by feminism, and emphasised the domination of men over women. First lesbian and gay campaigners began to object to this narrow interpretation that seemed either to preclude or sanction lesbian and gay pornography. Then racial minorities began to protest that this frame didn't account for racial abuse or violence. The Christian Right, whose interpretive frame emphasised obscenity, found no potential for congruence whatsoever. One response came from Cathryn MacKinnon, a feminist lobbyist. She transformed the interpretive frame to emphasise discrimination against women, invoking John Stuart Mill's harm principle, "a valid excuse for circumventing the First Amendment" and a frame that religious moralists and the Civil Rights Movement could both support. The frame further alienated lesbian and gay campaigners, and angered many feminists who didn't want to ally themselves with the Christian Right, so frame transformation is not without its problems (Carreon, 2003: 6-13).

Frame transformation can also involve a radical reinterpretation of the subject. Equal rights movements such as the Civil Rights Movement and the gay rights movement have sought to transform society's interpretive frames to see and judge their constituents not according to the colour of their skin or their sexuality, but by other less objectionable attributes.

These four kinds of frame alignment are important tools for social movements. They allow SMOs to enlarge or reinforce their sympathy and adherence pools, which in turn can help them achieve their ultimate aims. The aforementioned processes seem applicable to all social movements, but in particular to those who need to make their claims resonant and legitimate in broader public discourses, and for movements that otherwise struggle to gain the level of support they require (Stratham et al, 2002: p9).

Focussing on the pro-migrant and anti-racist movements in the UK, Stratham et al (2002) found that these two movements employed different kinds of frames for this reason. They distinguished four kinds of frame: diagnostic, which seek to identify and define the issue, often by attributing blame or causality; prognostic, which identify strategies, tactics and targets; motivational, which identify a rationale for action that is both normative and moral; and moral, which perform the same function as a diagnostic frame but with reference to moral norms rather than facts and beliefs. They found that the pro-migrant movement used a higher proportion of moral frames than the anti-racist movement, which used diagnostic frames more heavily (Stratham et al, 2002: 10).

Their explanation for this is that moral frames work well when the prevailing political climate is hostile to a movement's diagnostic frames. The anti-migrant movement has been so successful in amplifying their belief frame about migrants – a negative stereotype – in the general public that the pro-migrant movement is unable to transform the resulting dominant frame based on diagnosis. So it has to appeal to moral values to undermine this dominant frame, and win sympathy by ultimately transforming the frames that inform and guide the public on the issue.

This raises an important issue about framing. Thus far the impression given by my reconstructions of the arguments of Snow et al (1986) and Stratham et al (2002) have been one-sided insofar as they explain how a movement can seek to overcome some existing ambivalence or antagonism. But where there are two or more social movements that have antagonistic aims, framing is not just about recruiting sympathisers and adherents, but also about shaping wider public discourse.

In the case studies highlighted by Stratham et al (2002) and Lakoff (2003) it is clear that the social movements use frames to define the terms of discourse such that certain preconceptions and conceptual frameworks are introduced. The pro-migrant movement is forced to deploy moral frames because the anti-migrant movement has so successfully framed discourse by their own terms. The progressive liberal movement in America is in an even worse position since, according to Lakoff (2003), they haven't even reacted to their antagonists' frames with moral or diagnostic frames of their own, but have rather participated in discourse limited by their antagonists' frames. So when debating tax, for example, they are confronted with an uphill struggle of arguing for increases in the “tax burden” and for less “tax relief”.

The power that frames have, then, both for shaping or controlling public discourse, winning support and guiding collective action on any particular issue is significant. This raises a very traditional political dilemma, for the ability to use frames in the ways so far described is not universal; some social movements seem more adept at framing than others. So when dealing with social movements it can be difficult to establish the relative legitimacy of grievances, the accuracy of descriptive claims and the validity of normative claims independently of the frames the movements are seeking to impose. In fact, this seems impossible since we will always be analysing a movement from some kind of conceptual framework, which can lead to increasingly partisan movements that cannot recognise any validity in others' arguments for frame conflicts. SMOs may become engaged in a Machiavellian struggle for frame dominance.

So for social movements, frames are an extremely important tool. With them they can define public discourse about particular issues on their own terms, or at least introduce terms more congruent with their own ideological interpretations. They can then bridge, amplify, extend and transform frames to expand their sympathy and adherence pools, and strengthen their ability to dominant discourse in whichever sphere they happen to operate. Social movements are continuously constructing and developing frames ultimately to shape the political process in their favour. But in an environment where SMOs have aims that sometimes overlap and sometimes contradict one another, framing can create problems for the organisations and the wider public alike.

Bibliography

Carreon, A (2003), 'The Anti-Pornography Movement', American Buddha, http://www.american-buddha.com/ana.anti-porn.pdf

Klandermans, B (1997). The Social Psychology of Protest, Oxford: Blackwell.

Lakoff, G (2003). 'Framing the issues: UC Berkeley professor George Lakoff tells how conservatives use language to dominate politics', UC Berkeley News, http://www.berkeley.edu/news/media/releases/2003/10/27_lakoff.shtml

Snow, D.A, Burke, E., Worden, S.K., and Benford, R.D. (1986). 'Frame alignment processes, micromobilization, and movement participation', American Sociological Review, vol. 51, pp.464-81.

Statham, P. and Mynott, E. (2002). 'The Dilemma of Anti-Racist and Pro-Migrant Mobilisation in Britain: Visibility or Political Power?', Paper for the Joint Sessions of the ECPR, Turin. http://www.essex.ac.uk/ECPR/events/jointsessions/paperarchive/turin/ws23...